End of life decision-making for infants, young children and older children can be a very challenging and emotional experience for the child, parents, families and health professionals. Often questions over whether to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment can arise at the very beginning of an infant’s life, such as for extremely premature neonates, or infants with severe congenital conditions. Younger and older children may also suffer from health conditions or traumatic incidents which result in decisions about life-sustaining treatment.
This webpage discusses the law relating to medical treatment for children, including withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from children at the end of life. It also explains the Supreme Court and Family Court of Australia’s powers in this area.
Who can make decisions about medical treatment for children?
Consent is required before medical treatment can be provided to a child under the age of 18. Depending on the circumstances, in particular the age and maturity of the child, consent may be given by the child, the child’s parent or guardian, or a court.
Children and parents
Generally, where a child is under the age of 18, the child’s parents are the lawful decision-makers and have the power to consent to their child’s medical treatment. However, where a child is found to be competent he or she can lawfully make their own treatment decisions.
In Victoria and Tasmania, competent children also have the ability to make their own medical treatment decisions (i.e. without parental consent) through an Advance Care Directive. Similar to adults, the Directive will only apply when a child loses decision-making capacity. For further information visit Advance Care Directives Victoria and Tasmania.
In most Australian States and Territories a person becomes an adult and able to make their own treatment decisions upon reaching the age of 18. In South Australia however, a child who is 16 years of age (and, in some case, under 16) can also consent to treatment.
Courts
In all States and Territories the Supreme Court and the Family Court can hear cases relating to medical treatment for children, and may provide (or refuse) consent to treatment. Most cases are heard by the Supreme Court, which has power to make decisions for children as part of its parens patriae (protective) jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court exercises its powers cautiously, and only in cases where the court’s intervention is needed.
When consent is not required
Consent to treatment for a child is not required from a parent, the child or the court:
What factors are considered when making a decision about life-sustaining treatment for a child?
Common law
At common law the paramount consideration for parents and courts when making decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment is the child’s best interests. Such decisions are usually made in consultation with the child’s health professionals. If all parties agree, there will be no reason to approach the courts.
There are no set legal criteria for a child’s best interests so this is determined on a case by case basis. In relation to withholding and withdrawing treatment, some key factors the Australian courts have previously considered are:
- the likelihood that the treatment will cure or significantly improve the child’s health;
- medical opinion about the child’s diagnosis, prognosis and treatment;
- the child’s views and wishes, if any have been expressed;
- the parents’ views and wishes; and
- quality of life considerations now and in the future considering the child’s physical and cognitive impairments, and the benefits and burdens of treatment.
In most Australian cases the courts’ decision-making about best interests has been consistent with medical evidence, but this may not always be the case.
The parents’ and child’s views about treatment and best interests will be considered but are not decisive. Courts have regard to the age and maturity of the child when weighing their views but are unlikely to follow those views if that would cause the child harm.
Considerations of life or death are also significant. See for example State of Queensland v Nolan, where the decision to separate conjoined twins would result in either one or both twins dying, and Re Heather.
For a recent case involving parental decision-making and best interests for younger children at the end of life see Director Clinical Services, Child & Adolescent Health Services v Kiszko & Anor, and for cases about infants see Re Baby D (No 2) and Mohammed’s case.
Victoria
In Victoria, where a child does not have capacity the medical treatment decision-making legislation outlines the factors to be considered by a child’s medical treatment decision-maker (i.e. their parent) when making treatment decisions. These include the child’s values and preferences, the effects of treatment, and any alternatives to arrive at the decision the child would have made if she or he had capacity.
For younger children and infants, determining the child’s values and preferences is likely not possible. In those cases, the child’s parents must make a decision that promotes the child’s personal and social wellbeing. For further information about making treatment decisions in Victoria, see process 2 in 'How do medical treatment decision-makers make decisions?' on the Victorian Treatment Decisions webpage.
Tasmania
Under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas), when the child’s decision-maker (their parent and guardian) makes a decision, the child’s best interests are paramount. Consideration must also be given to:
- protecting the child from harm,
- promoting the child’s development, and
- strengthening, preserving and promoting positive relationships between the child and their parents, family members, and other significant people in the child’s life.
Decision-makers must also observe the decision-making principles outlined in the legislation. The principles are discussed on the Tasmanian Treatment Decisions webpage under ‘How do substitute decision-makers make decisions?’. The principles include providing the child with necessary decision-making support, using the child’s views, wishes and preferences to inform decision-making, and preserving the child’s cultural and linguistic environment.
When can a child make their own decisions about medical treatment?
A child who is competent may make their own treatment decisions without parental consent, including decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.
A child will be competent – often called ‘Gillick-competent’ – if they have sufficient understanding and intelligence to fully understand the treatment decision proposed. The ability to ‘fully understand’ means more is required than simply understanding the general nature of the treatment decision.
The term ‘Gillick-competent’ arose from a landmark British case (Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority). The issue in that case was whether a girl under 16 could lawfully give her own consent to receive contraceptive advice and treatment, without parental consent. The House of Lords decided that a child is Gillick-competent, meaning they can make decisions about their own health care and treatment without parental consent, if they achieve 'sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed'. The court stated that this is because a parent’s authority over a child is a dwindling right that changes and yields to the child’s right to make his or her own decision as the child matures and develops.
Each case will depend on the individual child and the decision that needs to be made. A child may be Gillick-competent for some medical decisions and not for others. If a child is not Gillick-competent the child’s parents will be required to make the treatment decision in accordance with the child’s best interests.
South Australia, Victoria and Tasmania also have legislation about decision-making by competent children.
South Australia
Under the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), a child under 16 is able to consent to treatment if the treating health professional considers the child is ‘capable of understanding the nature, consequences and risks of treatment’. The administering health professional must consider the treatment to be in the best interests of the child’s health and wellbeing, and another health professional must personally examine the child and support the treating health professional’s opinion.
The law also permits a child over 16 to make their own treatment decisions, and his or her decision has the same legal effect as an adult’s. It is currently unclear whether the Supreme Court would be able to override a decision to refuse treatment of a 16 or 17 year old (e.g. if the refusal was considered not to be in the child’s best interests).
VictoriaUnder the Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Act 2016 (Vic) there is a decision-making capacity test applicable to children in some circumstances. This is the same test as for adults. However, unlike an adult, there is no presumption of capacity for children, and a child must show that they have capacity.
A child who meets the test can:
It is unclear whether the test for decision-making capacity overrides or replaces Gillick-competence for other medical decisions in Victoria.
Further information about medical treatment for people under 18 years is available from the Victorian Office of the Public Advocate.
Tasmania
Under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas), a child will have the ability to make their own treatment decisions if the child is sufficiently mature to decide, and can:
- understand information relevant to the decision,
- retain that information for a sufficient time to make and communicate the decision,
- use or weigh information relevant to the decision, and
- communicate the decision e.g. by speech, gesture, or other means, including with support.
There is no presumption of capacity for children. Only when a health practitioner is satisfied that a child meets this test can they make their own treatment decisions, and make an Advance Care Directive about future medical treatment. For further information visit the Tasmania Advance Care Directives webpage.
Complaints and dispute resolution
End of life decision-making for children can be a very challenging and emotional time for everyone, particularly for the child, their parents, family and friends, and health professionals. Sometimes disputes arise about medical decision-making for the child. If anyone (including a health professional) is concerned about the decisions being made about the child's care or treatment, or a decision cannot be reached, that person can consult the treating hospital or health service about dispute resolution avenues.
Anyone interested in the health, welfare and wellbeing of a child at the end of life may consider applying to the Supreme Court for an order or declaration about the child's medical treatment. While a health professional or hospital can apply to the Supreme Court, they are under no obligation to do so. Where a health professional or hospital brings the application, they bear the costs of going to court. If no one applies to the Supreme Court, the health professional’s decision will remain.
Where a child, their family or carer is concerned that the child's health condition is getting worse or not improving as expected while the child is in a public hospital or receiving care, they may invoke Ryan's Rule in Queensland, or an equivalent rule in some other Australian jurisdictions. For example, in Queensland this rule provides a three-step process to address these issues:
1. Talking to a nurse or doctor about the concerns.
2. If the response is not satisfactory, talking to the nurse in charge of the shift.
3. If the response is not satisfactory, phoning 13 HEALTH (13 43 25 84) (or ask a nurse to call on your behalf) to request a Ryan's Rule Clinical Review. This will enable a nurse or doctor to review the child and assist.
Similar review processes to Ryan's Rule also exist in public hospitals in New South Wales. For other jurisdictions, see The Australian Charter of Healthcare Rights or the Complaints and dispute resolution sections of each State and Territory Treatment Decisions webpage.
Key cases
H v AC [2024] NSWSC 40
AC was diagnosed with Ewings sarcoma (bone cancer) of the pelvis with lung metastasis at aged 16. Treatment guidelines required delivery of chemotherapy every fortnight, with 17 cycles of treatment recommended.
AC received four cycles of treatment over 6 weeks, causing her to suffer side effects including hair loss, exhaustion, nausea and constipation. An MRI and FDG-PET scan were performed. These scans revealed a ‘spectacular decrease’ in the size of the tumour, but the MRI showed abnormal tissue structures containing persisting cancer. AC’s paediatric medical oncologist Dr A advised AC and her parents that the cancer was not cured and recommended continuing with treatment.
However, AC considered herself cured and believed that the cancer would not return. She refused to continue treatment, despite Dr A’s advice that there was a 100% likelihood of tumour progression in the next several months to 1-2 years, which would likely be resistant to treatment. Without further treatment, the cancer would relapse and result in death.
AC and her parents were devout Christians. AC believed she had a ‘personal relationship with Jesus’, that her cancer had been completely ‘cured by way of a miracle’, and that she did not have microscopic traces of cancer in her body. Over the following months a further meeting was undertaken between Dr A, other clinicians, AC, and her parents, and a capacity assessment was arranged with a psychiatrist. A follow up scan continued to show no cancer, but Dr A reiterated this did not mean the cancer was gone, rather there was no deposit of cancer big enough to show on the scan. A second opinion was sought from a paediatric specialist, who agreed with Dr A’s analysis. They considered that treatment would likely result in a 50% chance of permanent cure (later revised to 40-45% due to the delay) but having no treatment would highly likely cause death. AC continued to refuse treatment but stated that if future scans showed any relapse she would expect to undergo further treatment.
The hospital applied to the Court for:
- a declaration about AC’s capacity to refuse the recommended treatment, and
- a further declaration, in the event AC was found not to have capacity, allowing the hospital to lawfully carry out the recommended treatment.
AC’s parents indicated they would support AC in whatever decision she made. AC indicated that if the Court order her to undergo treatment she would not be happy but would do it.
Two psychologists agreed that ‘AC’s religious belief system prevents her from appropriately weighing the medical information which she continues to discount against the belief she responded favourably to miraculous intervention and the beneficence of God’. However, they considered AC had sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable her to fully understand the proposed medical treatment, why it was recommended, and to weigh the advantages and disadvantages.
The Court accepted that AC ‘has the ability to make decisions, including the ability to make a decision regarding refusal of the recommended treatment or continuation of the treatment, and in that sense is to be regarded as being ‘Gillick competent’’. However, based on the medical evidence, the Court determined it was clear that AC had cancer, and that it was in her welfare and best interests to continue treatment.
The Court used its protective (parens patriae) jurisdiction to authorise the hospital to carry out on AC the recommended treatment. In reaching its decision, the Court took into account:
- the sanctity of life, the medical evidence, and AC’s religious beliefs, right to bodily integrity, and autonomy in decision-making;
- the effects of treatment on AC, and that AC had handled earlier treatment well, without significant distress (based on evidence from Dr A and AC’s mother);
- the temporary impact of the physical effects of chemotherapy and that AC would likely fully recover from those after treatment;
- risks of treatment; and
- that AC had confirmed that if the cancer returned she most likely would have medical treatment.
S, a 3-year-old boy, was struck by a motor vehicle. He sustained a traumatic brain injury and a C 0/1 spinal cord injury, resulting in ventilator-dependent quadriplegia. He was mechanically ventilated, receiving artificial hydration and nutrition, and in an unresponsive coma.
There was consensus among S’s doctors that S had no conscious awareness, and that it was unlikely he would ever achieve any awareness. Without artificial, mechanical life-sustaining treatment his injuries were terminal, and all further treatment would be futile. They also believed that prolonging S’s life was inconsistent with his personal dignity, and that continuing the treatment would be unethical.
Medical opinion was divided about whether S was capable of feeling physical discomfort, and whether the physical manipulation of S, necessary to prolong his life, caused him pain and discomfort.
An application was brought by the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from S and commence palliative care. S’s parents opposed the discontinuation of treatment, but did not oppose the declarations sought by the hospital.
The Supreme Court ordered S’s life-sustaining treatment be removed and palliative care commence. The Court was persuaded by the unanimity of medical opinion. It remarked that stopping S’s treatment was justified due to the possibility he may be suffering pain and discomfort, and could suffer further ailments if life-sustaining treatment continued. The Court also noted that in the absence of any possibility of conscious existence, the dignity of the person is a real and significant factor which the Court should protect in the persons’ best interests. On futile treatment the Court said:
‘The right to receive medical treatment is not … equivalent to a right to the perpetuation of life irrespective of the circumstances. It may not be in the best interests of the patient to be given medical treatment that is excessively burdensome, intrusive or futile… the choice must be made on essentially medical considerations’.
5-year-old Tafida suffered irreversible brain damage due to a ruptured arteriovenous alformation. She had minimal, if any, consciousness, and was supported in hospital on artificial ventilation. If Tafida survived her doctors believed she would have profound disability, be ventilator dependent, and require permanent intensive care. They considered it was not in Tafida’s best interests to receive further treatment and recommended to her parents she be given palliative care only.
Tafida’s parents refused to consent to the withdrawal of Tafida’s treatment, and later sought for her to be transferred to a paediatric hospital in Italy, which was willing to care for her. The Italian hospital would also explore whether she could undergo a tracheostomy. If successful, this treatment would enable her to be cared for at home on long-term ventilation. There was evidence of other children in the UK with similar long-term ventilation requirements currently being cared for at home.
The hospital opposed transferring Tafida to the Italian hospital (on the grounds it was not in her best interests to be transferred), and sought a declaration that it was in Tafida’s best interests for life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn. Her parents disagreed. There was evidence Tafida had some understanding of her religious and cultural heritage and was developing her own religious identity. They argued that withdrawal of treatment causing death was against the beliefs and values of Tafida’s religion.
The Court concluded it was in Tafida’s best interests for life-sustaining treatment to continue. In reaching this conclusion, the Judge noted there was evidence that Tafida was unlikely to feel pain; was medically stable; that the burden of treatment on her was low; and that she was able to travel with minimal risk. There were medical views that she should continue receiving treatment so she could later return to her home, on ventilation, and be cared for by her family (who, the Judge noted, were loving and dedicated, and had a detailed, funded care plan). The Judge also remarked that continuation of treatment was consistent with the religious and cultural tenents by which Tafida was being raised, and that the sanctity of her life was of the highest importance.
Charlie was diagnosed with infantile onset encephalomyopathic mitochondrial DNA depletion syndrome (MDDS) at aged 2 months. He was paralysed and deaf, unable to breathe without support, and suffered kidney, heart and liver problems. His prognosis was poor.
In early 2017 Charlie’s parents discovered an experimental nucleoside treatment they believed might prolong Charlie’s life. They wanted to transport Charlie to the US to receive that treatment, which they argued was in Charlie’s best interests. Charlie’s clinicians considered whether to apply for ethical permission to attempt the therapy, which had never been used on patients with Charlie’s form of MDDS. However, Charlie’s condition subsequently deteriorated, and his clinicians considered that treatment would be potentially painful and futile.
In April 2017, when Charlie was 8 months old, the hospital sought and was granted an order permitting it to withdraw artificial ventilation and provide palliative care. The Court accepted medical evidence that Charlie’s encephalopathy was so severe that the proposed therapy would be futile, and, if attempted, may subject him to further pain. Charlie’s parents unsuccessfully appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal (May 2017), and the Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights (June 2017).
In July 2017, the hospital reopened the case after widespread international publicity resulted in new evidence about the possible benefits of nucleoside treatment to Charlie. However, prior to the case being decided further MRI scans showed that Charlie had little or no muscle in some parts of his body. As a result his parents accepted that further treatment was unlikely to assist Charlie, and that it was in his best interests to allow him to die.
Charlie’s parents withdrew their court application, and the High Court issued a judgment reaffirming its April 2017 orders that Charlie’s artificial ventilation be withdrawn, and palliative care provided.
This case involved a dispute between doctors and parents about medical treatment for K, a 6 year old child. In 2015 K was diagnosed with a brain tumour and underwent surgery. Following the surgery K’s doctors recommended he receive chemotherapy and radiation treatment. There was a risk of significant side effects from the radiotherapy including hearing loss, stroke, long-term hormone deficiencies, visual impairments including legal blindness, and ‘depression of intellect’. K’s parents preferred alternative and natural treatments, and palliative care, and objected to the proposed treatment. There was a delay in commencing treatment due to ongoing disagreement between K’s parents and doctors
The parents and the medical team were unable to reach agreement on the treatment regime. By March 2016 K’s disease had progressed. K's doctors estimated if treatment were given K would have a 50 to 60 percent chance of survival 5 years post-surgery. K’s parents continued to oppose treatment, and as a result the hospital applied to the Family Court for a determination. In March 2016 the Court ordered that K receive chemotherapy, despite K’s parents’ objections.
The chemotherapy was partially successful, but not sufficient to cure him. At a further court hearing in May 2016 the parents and medical team both agreed to continued chemotherapy. Radiotherapy, though recommended by K's doctors, was not ordered at either court hearing due to the parents’ concern that the treatment posed significant risks to K.
K's condition later deteriorated and in August 2016 the medical team sought orders from the Court to commence both chemotherapy and radiotherapy treatment, which they believed would give K with the best chance of cure. His parents continued to object to radiotherapy, arguing that K’s quality of life should be prioritised over curative treatment with a low chance of success and severe side effects.
The Court agreed with K's parents and decided that receiving palliative care rather than treatment was in K’s best interests. In making this decision, the Court gave considerable weight to K’s parent’s views, K's deteriorating health, the possible side effects of the proposed treatment, the medical evidence, and the now greatly reduced chance of a cure due to the delay in commencing curative treatment.